does not terminate itself; other functionality, explained next, continues to execute. In fact, all previous variants of Sobig, except the first (Sobig.A), have a built-in date after which they stop propagating (see Table 1 ). From the continued release of new versions of Sobig with built-in propagation-termination dates, we can surmise that a single individual or organization with access to the worm's source code is responsible for all the variants. With Sobig.D, the worm also started making use of a built-in list of network time protocol (NTP) servers to obtain the current date and time, upon which it makes time-based decisions. This is likely an attempt to enforce the time restrictions on infected systems that have the incorrect time.
Multistage malicious code
Sobig also includes an upgrade mechanism. Sobig variants A-C downloaded files hosted at geocities. com from static embedded URLs. The downloaded files contained other URLs that pointed to files that Sobig downloaded and executed. By controlling the Geocities-hosted file contents, the worm author could direct the worm to download and execute files located anywhere on the Internet. This mechanism's weakness is that the pointing to Geocities are Calling all malware reporters hard coded. Once they identified the URLs, security researchers could access the sites to determine what programs were being downloaded and executed, analyze their functionality, and devise detection mechanisms. The worm's author attempted to hide this weakness by placing a decoy URL in the Geocitieshosted file for most of the time. When a security researcher downloaded the file to examine the URL, in most instances, it would be invalid. The worm's author only updates the valid URL file for short periods of time, but the worm continuously attempts to download the URL, so it has a high probability of hitting the valid URL and downloading and executing the file it pointed to.
ELIAS LEVY Symantec
The valid URL pointed to a new malicious code, named Backdoor.Lala (http://securityresponse.symantec. com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor. lala.html). This backdoor installed a keystroke logger and permitted the attacker to steal sensitive information, such as stored passwords and cookies, and to download and execute files.
According to Joe Stewart of LURHQ Corporation (www.lurhq. com/sobig.html), the worm's author then seems to have used the backdoor to disinfect Sobig's system and install the Wingate (www.wingate.com) proxy program on infected computers. The Wingate proxy server lets spammers launder their connections through the infected hosts, hiding the spams' real source.
Independence from Geocities
Another problem with the hardcoded URL upgrade mechanism is that Geocities became very efficient at shutting down the offending URLs. Starting with Sobig.D, however, the upgrade mechanism changed (www. lurhq.com/sobig-e.html).
Sobig.D and Sobig.E included a list of hosts that they attempted to contact by sending UDP packets to port 8998 between 7:00pm and 11:59pm UTC. As with the Geocities update mechanism, the response was often invalid, but these systems occasionally responded with an encrypted URL that Sobig could retrieve and execute.
Once again, the next malicious download was a variant of Backdoor.Lala, which also disinfected the system of Sobig and installed the Wingate proxy, although this time the ports changed, probably because the earlier port number had been compromised.
In addition, the new variants opened and listened on UDP ports 995-999. By sending a UDP packet to these ports, the author could update the list of servers to contact for the URL to download. Thus, even if the hosts in the hard-coded host list still listening to UDP port 8998 became disinfected or were shut down, the author could attempt to recover them using Wingate on the infected hosts to scan for hosts with UDP ports 995-999 open and sending them a new host list.
The quick spread of some variants and the receipt of infected messages in long-ago decommissioned email addresses has lead to the speculation that spamming seeded at least some variants of Sobig-ironic because a worm used to improve the author's ability to spam was itself spread through spam. These attack approaches outline a disturbing trend. The growing anger and ongoing war against spam-and the temptation of easy money-has led some spammers to start using computer-hacker and malware author techniques. Spammers are moving from the legal gray area of using open relays and proxies to send their messages to the decidedly illegal commandeering of unknowing users' computers to continue with their activities. We can expect the problem to become worse as efforts increase to stamp out spam.
S
Still, new security measures are not needed. Existing ones, such as personal firewalls and antivirus measures, are sufficient. More importantly, good security practices-such as not executing attachments and keeping up with security patchesare paramount. 
